Written by Paul Michael Ezeoha
Premier League's match day 27 saw two mainstays of English football face off against each other in the Great North West derby. The final result was a 0-2 score line in favour of the men from Merseyside .
A fair contest; the difference between both teams was the two goals scored by Mohamed Salah and Dominick Szoboszlai in the first half.
This analysis therefore unravels the tactical approach of both teams.
MAN CITY'S STARTING LINE UP
Pep Guardiola's men lined up in a 4-2-3-1 formation. Ederson Moraes mounted in the goal post; Josko Gvardiol started at left back; Nathan Ake and Khusanov paired at central back; while Rico Lewis takes the place of injured Manuel Akanji at right back.
The young Spaniard, Nico Gonzalez and the Belgian midfield maestro, Kevin De bruyne paired in the holding midfield position for City.
Ahead of them were the three players: Doku who was positioned in the leff midfield channel, Phil Foden who started in the number 10 position behind the striker, and Savinho who was stationed in the right midfield channel.
Marmoush operated in the number 9 position once again in place of the injured Haaland.
(Figure 1) Man City's 4-2-3-1 lineup.
LIVERPOOL'S FORMATION
Liverpool's head coach , Arne Slott, opted for a similar formation as Man City- 4-2-3-1. The Brazilian shot stopper, Allison played inbetween the sticks for Liverpool. The back four Consists of Robertson at left back ; Virgil Van Dijk and Konate partnered in central back; while Arnold started at right back.
The holding midfield duo was Mac Allister and Gravenberch.
The three players ahead of them were Curtis Jones positioned at left midfield channel; Dominick Szoboszlai operating in the number 10 role ; and Mohammed Salah positioned at the right midfield channel.
The number 9 role was manned by Luis Diaz.
(Figure 2) Liverpool's 4-2-3-1 lineup.
MAN CITY'S IN-POSSESSION TACTICS VS LIVERPOOL'S DEFENSIVE TACTICS
Man City did prioritized ball retention (this is in fact a major element of Pep's philosophy, as he believes that a team with enough ball possession would have the edge over their opponent, because they would create enough goal scoring opportunities).
In essence, they had more possession of the ball than Liverpool( Man City - 67% and Liverpool- 33%) even though the latter were victors.
To properly retain possession of the ball, City's players were in proximity to each other.
Two or more players were always available as potential passing options for the ball carrier/holder(This is also part of Pep's philosophy- the Principle of Positional Play, one which demands a rigid adherence to certain positions on the pitch in relation to the game phase).
Furthermore, City's structure was dynamic while in this phase. They employed a mixed pattern of ball possession and progression: short(doing so patiently in order to disorientate Liverpool's defensive shape/ structure so as to create space to advance play) and long passes(playing the ball directly ,especially from their own half, to the forward running players up front so as to catch Liverpool's defense off guard,thus leading to dangerous situations) .
Also, they assumed varying shape depending on where they had the ball on the pitch and also-majorly- with the aim of adapting to Liverpool's defensive shape. For instance,there were several scenarios in the game where they maintained a 4-2-4 shape when had the ball in their own half.
(Figure 3) Man City in their 4-2-4 shape when in possession of the ball in their own half. In this scenario, the back four of two central backs and the full backs (it is important to note that Kevin De Bruyne had dropped from an advanced number 8 role to occupy the right full back position. In doing so, he intend to operate in the bulk of space at the side of Liverpool's midfield area); the two holding midfielders ; two central advanced players(an attacking midfielder and the number 9 who had dropped to the midfield to create numerical superiority in the midfield area) ; and the two wide players(the left winger is visible in the picture, while the right winger is just outside of view) .
When Man City progressed the ball forward into Liverpool's half, we did see this shape change into somewhat of a 2-3-5 formation: the two central back seating deep to provide cover at the back, the three central midfield consisting of Nico Gonzalez and the two inverted full backs(Lewis and Gvardiol) who operate in the half spaces and provided supports for the attacking players .
With this three midfielders behind the front 5, Pep's plan was to create a shield to neutralize Liverpool's counter attack(although they weren't very effective in this course).
The front 5 consist of the two wingers who were spread very wide so as to stretch Liverpool's shape in order to create space for City's central positioned players to progress into the final third; the two midfielders both occupying advanced role in the halfspaces; and the number 9 .
The number 9 position was a free role, as any of the front 5 players could operate there, but for most of the game it was Marmoush who played there.
In the scenario below, this shape is visible. But in this case, Foden is the one operating in the number 9 position.
Rico Lewis plays a pass to the right winger, Savinho.
At the other hand, De Bruyne(who is mounted in the right half space) makes a run toward Savinho's side. In doing so, he(De Bruyne) attracts one of Liverpool's deep lying midfielders to himself, this therefore created space for Foden(who has now dropped from his number 9 position) to receive the pass from Savinho in pockets of space in-between Liverpool's defense and midfield lines. Foden then turns and shoot, but it was comfortably saved by Allison Becker.
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This 2-3-5 shape did change into a 2-3-1-4. In this scenario,Foden and Marmoush occupy the number 9 position simultaneously, while Kevin De Bruyne operates behind them.
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Jeremy Doku drives with the ball towards Liverpool's box 18.
Now, a pass to De Bruyne could have led to a really clear goal chance, as he (De Bruyne who is a master of pass) would have enough space to thread in a line breaking pass to any of the front two players whose perpendicular body orientation would enable them to hit the ball with their favorite foot.
Another fact to bear in this situation is that, because they are positioned vertically in relation to the goal post, they would able to have a full view of the post's length and width, thus, they could easily place the ball beyond the reach of Allison.
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Instead, Doku decides to play the ball to Marmoush.
This only resulted in a half chance, as Marmoush couldn't find the target because his body orientation meant that he would hit the shot with his weaker foot.
Therefore,he failed to score.
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Liverpool on the other hand, opted for a more strategic pressing approach.
Higher up the pitch in City's half, they maintained their default 4-2-3-1 shape.
In this shape, the goal was to remain as compact as possible in the central region so as to prevent City from progressing through this area. So they collapsed to their high to mid block early on, blocking passing lanes to the central region of the pitch.
In this way, they allowed City to have much of the ball, while only seeking to commit to an intense pressure when City made loose passes , play the ball out wide or if the ball holder becomes sloppy with the ball.
Below is a scenario of their pressing structure:
(Figure 14) Liverpool's 4-2-3-1 pressing shape higher up the pitch.
(Figure 15) In this same scenario, we see how they remained really compact in the central region of the pitch. They allowed City's defender to hold onto the ball, while forming a danger zone in this central region. Each of Liverpool's players kept close tabs on City's players in this central region. In doing so, they left City's ball holder with no other options than to play the ball to the second defender. This is in fact what Liverpool wanted him to do.
(Figure 16) Having passed the ball to the right central back, Diaz jumps to apply mild pressure while using his cover shadow to block passing lane to Rico Lewis. In doing so, he intends to force City's defender to play the ball to the wide region where Liverpool players could easily shift across in their number to then cage the ball holder and in turn steal the ball away from him.
(Figure 17) Khusanov therefore decides to play the ball to the wider region for Rico Lewis.
(Figure 18) As soon as Lewis drifted to receive the ball, Jones jumps to apply intense pressure.
(Figure 19) Meanwhile, Diaz supports the press by cutting passing lane to the right central back. In this way, Ricco Lewis has become ensnared by Liverpool players.
(Figure 20) Consequently, Diaz ends up stealing the ball from Lewis.
(Figure 21) Jones collects the ball and plays it to Szoboszlai.
Szoboszlai further finds Diaz in space, but he couldn't make good use of the ball.
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Furthermore, when Liverpool defended in their low block, this shape did changed into a 4-2-4: the back four; the two holding midfielders; and the front four now in a single horizontal line consisting of the two wingers in the half spaces and who share the same vertical lines with the fullbacks, the striker and the number ten.
(Figure 25) Liverpool's 4-2-4 shape when they collapsed to their low block.
Although the goal was to remain very compact - working collectively to terminate spaces between the lines - yet this shape came with it's own fault(s).
Here is one this faults. Because Liverpool wanted to maximize their chances during counter attacks by trying to release one of their wingers when they gain possession of the ball, we did see the two wingers- in an occasion -falling to help out in defensive duties because they maintained higher positions in expectation of counter attack.
Due to this fault, their defensive shape did become less compact in some, therefore giving Man City the opportunity to create goal scoring chances(although they weren't clinical enough).
In the scenario below, although one of the holding midfielders did a great job in covering for the left full back, yet we see how Salah's failure to track back on time presented Doku with enough space and time to control the pass from the right winger and shoot. But fortunately for Liverpool, this shot was too easy for Allison Becker to save.
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LIVERPOOL'S IN-POSSESSION TACTICS VS MAN CITY'S DEFENSIVE TACTICS
As mentioned earlier, Man City did possess much of the ball than Liverpool. In addition to this,they had more attempts on goal with a total of 16 compared to Liverpool's 8.
These facts notwithstanding, Liverpool were still the most dangerous in the attacking phase. Although they had fewer shots in the game, yet they gained a higher XG(Expected goal) ratio - 0.71% and Man City 0.65%.
This is to say that in as much as they had fewer attempts on goal , these shots were more goal bound than City's 16 shots.
A fact that is reflected in their 2 goals and City's non.
In particular, when in possession of the ball, Liverpool maintained their default shape of 4-2-3-1.
It is important to direct our attention to the strategic approach which comes with this shape of theirs: the proximity of the back four(the central backs and the flat full backs) alongside the two holding midfielders, when they build up play from the back.
This serves as a decoy to attract Man City's players, thus freeing up space in the midfield channel for a pass to the number 10(mostly Szoboszlai) who would seek to bring the attacking force alive.
Having a flat back four provides Liverpool with a solid defensive cover against counter attacks.
This is a recurring theme in Liverpool's playing style this season- one of the few overt modification made by Arne Slott on Klopp's already established game model.
In the scenario below, we see this aforementioned shape and tactic playing out: Liverpool in their 4-2-3-1 in-possession shape. They build up play in their half with a flat back four and the two holding midfielders staying in proximity .
This tempts five of City's players to commit to the press, therefore freeing up space for Szoboszlai to receive in the midfield. He receives the ball and plays a pass to the advancing Gravenberch while making a forward run himself behind City's defense.
Gravenberch plays him through;he gets to the pass and squares it to Curtis Jones who then finishes.
But unfortunately, the goal was ruled out for offside.
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This same shape and tactic was what led to Diaz's saved chance.
This time around, it was Curtis Jones who was in the number 10 position while Szoboszlai occupied Salah's position on the right flank.
Salah now plays as the number 9, and Diaz operates in the left flank.
One of the holding midfielders plays a pass to Jones in the midfield zone. He turns and plays the ball to the forward rushing Robertson. He(Robertson) then sends the ball to Diaz who dribbles with it into City's box 18 before curling a shot towards the roof of the net, but it was safely parried away by Ederson Moraes.
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Another noticeable style of play when Liverpool were in possession of the ball was playing from the flanks. During several occasions, we did see long balls from players in the deeper regions of their own half to these wide players.
In particular, Mohammed Salah was the point man in up front.
It is important to note that for most of Liverpool's matches that he had featured in this season, he was deployed majorly as a traditional winger- providing the width for the team.
(Figure 44) Heat map showcasing Salah's average position in all competitions for Liverpool in the 2024/25 season.
In doing so, he intend to harness Salah's technicality and pace during Liverpool's attacking phase of the game.
Salah has without doubts flourished in this role- creating several chances for his teammates, providing tangible number of assists, and scoring a lot of goals.
(Figure 45) Salah's stats this season.
The below images showcase Liverpool's characteristic attacking style of play.
(Figure 46) Liverpool build up play in their 4-2-3-1 shape. Man City on the other hand, maintain a high defensive line.
Trent Alexander Arnold loops a through ball over City's defensive line to release Mo Salah.
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(Figure 49) Salah gets to the ball and dribbles with it towards City's box 18.
He finds Szoboszlai at the edge of the box.
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He then places the ball beyond Ederson's reach into the goal post. Liverpool went 2-0 up !
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Conversely, without the ball, Man City employed strategic pressing tactic similar to that of Liverpool.
When Liverpool build up play deeper in their own half, precisely during goal kicks, City pressed high up the pitch in a 4-1-3-2 shape.
Just like Liverpool, City didn't really seek to apply pressure at first; rather, they maintained a compact shape in the middle of the pitch so as to prevent Liverpool from progress play through this area.
(Figure 53) Man City in their centrally compact 4-1-3-2 shape when Liverpool build up play deep in their half.
The cue to begin applying pressure was when the ball is played to a player in the wide region.
(Figure 54) A pass to the Liverpool's right full back meant that Doku had to jump to press him.
(Figure 55) The full back therefore plays the ball to the right central back, Konate. As the ball travels to him, City's left central forwarder applies pressure on him ,and his teammates remained compact centrally while also keeping tabs on Liverpool's players in this region.
(Figure 56) Konate passes it over to the goal keeper.
The pass played to Allison was also another cue for City to apply pressure . So the forwarder applies much pressure on Allison while using his cover shadow to cut out passing lane to Konate. With this, Allison has no other option but to send the ball in field so as to avert giving loosing it to City's players closer to his post.
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In doing so, Allison ends up giving the ball to Savinho. He (Savinho) further plays a pass to Lewis close by ; and Lewis finds Foden in spac.
Foden then picks out Marmoush who had made a diagonal run behind City's defense.
Marmoush shoots and scores, but fortunately for Liverpool it was ruled out for offside.
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Also, City maintained an idiosyncratic 4-4-2 compact shape when they collapsed to both their mid and low blocks.
This shape consists of the back four, a midfield line consisting of the two holding midfielders and the two wingers who are now tucked inwardly into the midfield area, and the forward line which include the striker(Marmoush) and the number ten(Phil Foden) .
In these phases the goal was simple: protect the central region of the pitch and force play out wide where they can easily shift across to defend.
(Figure 67) Man City's 4-4-2 shape in their mid-block.
(Figure 68) When they retreated to their low block, City's shape still remained a 4-4-2. In this image, the double central forward players are not visible.
Although City tried to maintain a really compact defensive structure collectively as a team, yet their major flaw lies in the defenders inability to properly coordinate themselves so as to track those forward runners behind their high line.
This is infact what led to two of Liverpool's goals, although one was ruled out for offside.
CONCLUSION
To wrap things up, it could be said that both teams employed similar tactics when in possession of the ball and also out of possession - brilliant ones in deed.
Whereas the home side did gain the upper hand in terms of ball retention and attempts on goal, the visitors, Liverpool, were more threatening attacking wise.
