MATCH ANALYSIS : ARSENAL VS MAN CITY

By Paul Michael Ezeoha 

Quite a thrilling fixture, the Gunners were without doubt the better team as they comfortably cruised past Manchester City (5-1) in front of their over 50 thousand fans at the Emirate Stadium last week Sunday. A victory well deserved ! 

This analysis therefore evinces several cogent game strategy/tactics employed by both teams. In particular, it takes a look at one of Arsenal's major gunnery during the game: counter attacks , a phenomenon which perfectly exploited the gap in Man City's overly attacking oriented formation . 

                  

                         

                            

   ARSENAL'S ANALYSIS

Wide Overloads 

One noticeable strategy of Arsenal's during the game, was the constant overload of the left flank . This overload usually involved the left winger( Trossard ), the two holding midfielders( Rice and Partey ) ,one of the central backs ( Usually Gabriel ) , and one of the two attacking midfielders ( Odegaard ). In this structure, the players were very fluid as they regularly interchanged positions .  

( Figure 1) Trossard( who is at the winger position) , Gabriel ( the left central back), Rice ( one of the holding midfielder who is currently positioned at the full back position ) and Skelley ( the left back who is now positioned in the holding midfield role alongside Partey ) create an overload at the left hand flank of the pitch.

By having players overload the flank while in possession of the ball , Man City players would be forced to deal with this threat by trying to cut out passing lanes and even going man-to-man with the Arsenal players. This would in turn create a loophole in their defensive structure, which Arsenal players exploited . 

(Figure 2) Man City Players : the right back, winger and holding midfielder - opted to regain possession , this therefore created space behind the full back . 

(Figure 3) Skelly spots the space and attacks it. 

(Figure 4) But luckily for Man City , the pass was too much for him.

This same strategy was what led to Skelley's goal : this time Gabriel ( who is now in the winger's position ) , Rice ( in a full back position) , Odegaard ( in an attacking midfielder's position) and Skelly( at the edge of the City's box 18) formed a box-like shape in the wide area of the pitch. Because the likes of Foden( at the right wing position) , Matheus Nunes ( at the right back position) , Bernardo Silva( at the deep midfield position ) were all pinned by Rice, Gabriel, and Odegaard , respectively; space was created for Skelly to receive the pass from Rice and advance with the ball to then score the goal ( although he should have been closed down by Marmoush if he had anticipated it on time ).

(Figure 5)

( Figure 6)

(Figure 7) 

Strategic High Press and Swift Counter Attacks 

Another strategy evident in Arsenal , was their well planned high press. Applying intense press/ pressure on opponents high up the pitch, is a common playing philosophy of most , if not all, top teams in Europe today. This is because in winning the ball high up the pitch means that the team have shorter distance to cover before getting to opponent's goal .Mikel Arteta's Arsenal are ardent subscribers to such philosophy( a fact that was well buttressed by their intense pressure high up the pitch during the match ).

They were strategic in applying pressure against City . This is seen in the events that resulted in the first goal . For most instances in the game, Man City opted to play short passes during goal kicks instead of playing long balls . So their default formation during goal kicks was a 3 - 2 - 2 - 3 ( three central defenders, two holding midfielders , two box- to box midfielders , and the two wingers and a striker ) . In order to prevent Man City from building play adequately, as they( Man City)  could cause real damage with the ball, Arsenal's pressed high up the pitch with a 4 -1 - 4 - 1 or a 4- 1- 2 - 2 - 1 formation . The four defenders maintained a high line during this situation; Thomas Partey played as the sole holding midfielder, and was there to provide cover for the defensive line, while also willing to track down one of City's deep-dropping forwarders ; the two wingers ( Trossard and Martinelli ) who were tucked in wardly and had the responsibilities of occupying Man City's spread out three central backs ; the two advancing midfielders( Odegaard and Rice ) who kept tabs on City's two holding midfielders ; and Havertz operating in the number 9 position .  

(Figure 8) Arsenal in their pressing shape : a 4-2-2-1 . Visible in this scenario is the 2 wingers who kept tabs on City's wide central backs , the two attacking midfielders occupying the two holding midfielders ,and the number 9.

Most noteworthy is their strategy for executing the press. Kai Havertz played a critical role in this strategy, as he didn't apply pressure to actually regain the ball ;rather, his role was to force City into playing in one side of the pitch where his team mates are man - to -man against them , thus they could easily regain the ball . 

(Figure 9) Havertz cuts out passing lanes so that Stephan would not be able to play through to the far wide right back , as he intends to make City play through the holding midfielders where Odegaard and Rice are tight on their holding midfielders.

( Figure 10 ) Stephan then plays a pass to the sweeper defender ,John Stones , on his left instead . This causes Odegaard to jump. He( Odegaard ) applies pressure on the ball holding defender while using his cover shadow to cut out passing lane to Kovacic . Due to the manner of Odegaard's press coupled with the inverted positioning of Martinelli and Rice's man -to - man tackle against Bernardo Silva,  the center of the pitch is out of the option . Now he could either play the ball far up the pitch and stand a chance of giving the ball away, or he could play a pass to the left central back, which is also a risky choice because Martinelli's positioning also allows him to close down the left central back. 

(Figure 11) John Stones therefore decides to play the ball to the far right central back, Akanji, instead .

(Figure 12) This was a very risky pass, as Akanji was immediately closed down by Trossard , which eventually resulted in him giving the ball away. 

 

So having gained possession of the ball, Trossard  swiftly advances with it to the final third. He eventually picks out Odegaard who taps it into City's open net. 

( Figure 13)

(Figure 14)

This takes us to another lethal strategy of Arsenal's : quick counter attacks . Counter attack goes hand in hand with high pressing, because in winning the ball, especially higher up the pitch, teams must immediately exploit the spaces in opponent's structure( Arsenal's first goal above being a good instance of this ). Arsenal were very swift during attacking turn overs and , invariably, did create several dangerous situations out of them .  There were several occasions in the game when their rapidity during counter attacks proved disastrous for City. 

Kai Havertz's goal is an example of such event :

(Figure 15) Thomas Partey gains possession after City had lost the ball deep in Arsenal's half. He immediately plays a through ball to Martinelli who has a lot of space ahead of him to run into. 

(Figure 16) Martinelli eventually reaches the ball.

(Figure 17) His inward dribbling with the ball takes out two of City's defender, thereby giving Havertz the freedom to make an overlapping run towards Martinelli's side. 

(Figure 18) Havertz receives the ball from Martinelli, cuts to his left foot ,

(Figure 19) and places the ball to the left corner of City's goal post.  Arsenal went 3 goals up ! 

Also, Martinelli's missed chance is another instance which reflects Arsenal's rapidity on the counter . 

(Figure 20) Arsenal in their traditional compact 4-4-2 shape during a low - block defensive action. So in order for City to try and break down this rigid defense, they committed 8 players in the attack. 

(Figure 21) Man City loses the ball again in Arsenal's half . This places them in jeopardy , as the commitment of 8 players higher up the pitch creates a lot of gap behind . This gives Arsenal's  players( mostly the wingers) enough space to run into during counter attack. 

(Figure 22) Declan Rice receives the ball and advances with it . The void created in Man City's defensive line meant that Arsenal's wide players have so much space to run into .

(Figure 23) Rice eventually plays a through ball to Martinelli who has dashed behind City's defense. 

Martinelli does well to reach the ball on time, dribbles into City's box and shoots . But fortunately for Man City, he failed to find them back of the net. 

( Figure 24) 

(Figure 25)

  

MAN CITY'S ANALYSIS

 

Although Manchester City weren't at their best form during the match , yet they displayed cogent tactics / strategies. The first is their structure/formation when in possession of the ball . Precisely, this structure was a 3 - 1 - 5 - 1  when they had the ball at a more advanced area of the pitch.  

(Figure 26) Man City's 3-1-5-1 in-possession formation higher up the pitch. 

One advantage which this structure offered them was numerical superiority at the center region of the pitch. In ( figure 26) above , City have 4 players in the midfield ( Stones ,having changed position with Kovacic, now operates in the holding midfield; Savinho, Bernardo Silva and Phil Foden in the attacking midfield role ) against Arsenal's 2 . With this superiority , they can dominate possession and dictate the tempo of  the game in this region.

    

Also, this structure makes it easy for line breaking vertical pass which could result in the successful progression of the ball to the final third. A pass to City's holding midfielder would cause one of the two Arsenal's midfielders to jump. If he(City's holding midfielder)  successfully gets hold of the pass and plays the ball to one of the three forward minded midfielders who are positioned just behind Arsenal's midfield line, this could lead to several dangerous situations. 

Firstly, if one of the defenders decide to close the ball carrier, it could create gap in Arsenal's defensive line which Haaland can seek to take advantage of. A pass to him could lead to a goal scoring situation. Secondly, should the ball played to Bernardo Silva( at the middle of the three attacking midfielders) by any chance, it could also lead to a goal scoring chance. This is so because Haaland's positioning pins one of the central backs; furthermore, the two midfielders ( Savinho and Foden) could also occupy another central back and the left full back, respectively. The winger (Marmoush in this scenario) would also occupy Arsenal's right back. In this way, Bernardo ( who is in a favorable position ) would have enough time and space with the ball. He could dribble with the ball to then shoot ( let's not forget he is a really really lethal left shooter ! ) .  

But in reality City didn't try to execute enough of this playing pattern during the game. 

Additionally, the second advantage of this structure is noticeable when they had the ball at the final third . At this phase of the pitch, this structure of theirs presented different passing pattern and shooting angles . 

 (Figure 27) Savinho attempts to make a diagonal run, so, in order to prevent the pass from getting to Saliba tracked him down. This could therefore create space for Marmoush to curl a shot to the right corner of the post . Thus a shooting angle would be created.

(Figure 28) Also, he could choose to table the ball for Bernardo at the edge of the box , or play a pass to the arriving Foden . Bernardo's  and Foden's body postures in this instance, would allow them to better send the ball to an angle in the post. Therefore, another shooting angle would be created .

(Figure 29) But then, he decides to play a diagonal pass to Savinho. Although Savinho couldn't make good use of the pass, yet we could see the various passing options( who are in favourable shooting positions) available : Haaland who could tap the ball into the net , Bernardo Silva who could place it to the left corner of the post, and Phil Foden who could arrive at the edge of the box to shoot . 

Haaland's goal came about as a result of the dynamic play together with the many attacking oriented players of this structure . 

(Figure 30)The two wingers pins Arsenal's full backs , while the striker alongside an attacking midfielder ,occupy 3 defenders to one side of the pitch. In the wake of this event, space is created in the right half space in Arsenal's 18 yard box. Foden then receives a pass from Matheus Nunes, makes a turn

(Figure 31) and plays a pass to Savinho who had made a run to receive the ball in the created space . 

(Figure 32) He floats an aerial ball towards Haaland

      (Figure 33) who then finishes with a 

          header .

The Roles of the Dual Number 8s 

Finally, another noticeable strategic / tactical phenomenon is the role of Man City's double number 8s. The deployment of double number 8s , is one thing that Pep Guardiola is well known for at the different clubs he had  coached. 

The double 8s also known as the Mezzalas or the box-to-box midfielders , are midfielders who could operate in creative roles high up the pitch ( more like number 10), and are also able to drop to more deeper regions in the midfield to help in the build up phase when their is a need for them to. These players could be deployed in different formations like 4-3-3 ,3-4-3, 3-5-2, and in rare cases , the 4-4-2 formation. 

One reason why Pep likes making use of these players is due to the fact that they aid his team to better retain possession of the ball during the build up phase. Because these players are very flexible, they could operate in different areas of the pitch- working in tandem -so as to provide passing options for their team mates. In doing so, they would help the team better retain possession and dominate the opponent . 

(Figure 34) 

In (Figure 34) above,City's two box -to-box midfield pair: Marmoush in this situation and Foden, drops to deeper regions of the pitch so as to create passing options for their team mates. In doing so , City could have an outlet away from Arsenal's aggressive press. 

A successful pass to one of these midfielders would give City an edge in progressing the ball to the final third. This is so because, if Foden who has enough space( due to late closing down by Gabriel) , eventually receives the ball, he could play a quick pass to Savinho who is free on the left flank, then he ( Foden ) could make an off- the-ball run ( i.e , a run without the ball) forward . With Haaland occupying the defense just few yard away, the three players could then combine to create danger for Arsenal . 

Another option would be for Foden to turn and dribble with the ball towards Arsenal 's half . With Savinho on the right flank , and Haaland just ahead of him,several goal scoring opportunities would be created for City: firstly, Haaland's presence in Arsenal's defense line and the arriving Savinho would make it difficult for Arsenal's defenders to attempt to close Foden down Foden, as if they decide to, huge space would be created in the defense which either Haaland or Savinho could run into to receive a pass from Foden. If they should decide to hold their ground and not jump to close down Foden, he would have enough space and time to either shoot from long range or dribble with the ball into the penalty box to try to shoot from closer range. 

In addition, because the two 8s drop from advanced positions to deeper ones , their movement draged two Arsenal players ( Partey and one of the central back, Saliba who were man-marking these players) out of their deeper positions. This could as well create gap in Arsenal's back line .City could seek to play a long ball from deeper regions to Haaland who could be willing to attack this space created behind Arsenal's defensive line , thus leading to a goal scoring chance . 

The above suggestions are just what I thought City should have done in the game . They should have exploited the advantages which the double number 8s provide . Unlike their past victory against Chelsea at the Ethihad where they did make good use of these forward midfielders ; they however, failed to really get enough passes to them during this match . Their failure to pick out these double 8s could be ascribed to their inability to spot these two midfielders in space ,and wrong decisions from the players when in possession of the ball. 

In conclusion , it was a well deserved victory for the Gunners - one made possible thanks to a well executed tactical and strategic plan by the players. Thus reflecting the ingenuity of Mikel Arteta as a coach. Man City on the other hand, have not been at their best for the most of this season, a predicament punctuated not only because they lost the match, but also due to several inadequacies and blunders . Hopefully, Pep and his men would take the necessary actions to get better. Can't wait to see them bounce back to their usual performance.  

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