Written by Paul Michael Ezeoha
Atletico Madrid hosted arch rivals, Real Madrid, at the Estadio Metropolitano for the second leg encounter in the Uefa Champions League Round of 16.
It could be said, without much animosity, that the home team looked the most dangerous side in the tie, with a total of 17 shots on goal and 8 on target, and an overall XG of 1.36. These data surpasses Real's 10 shots on goal, 3 on target and a total XG of 1.15.
Although Atletico Madrid couldn't advance to the next stage of the competition as they were vanquished on penalty shootouts,yet they did put up some fine display during this fixture.
This tactical analysis is therefore charged with the aim of bring to the limelight those tactical details noticeable in Atletico Madrid team during this UCL fixture.
ATLETICO MADRID LINEUP
Atletico Madrid lined up in 4-4-2 on paper, a likewise formation of the first leg fixture at the Santiago Bernabeu, only the difference being that two changes were made to the squad that started the game that night. Reinildo took the place of Galan at left back. English man, Gallagher replaced Brazilian winger, Lino at the left hand flank- a change which reflects Diagonal Simeone's defensive priority precisely against Real 's fast wingers.
The lineup goes thus:
Jan Oblak started in between the sticks. The back four include Reinildo at left back, Clement Lenglet and Jose Maria Gimenez paring at central back, and Marcos Llorente retaining his position at right back.
The four-man midfield include Gallagher at the left flank, the holding midfield double pivot of Barrios Rivas and Raul De Paul, and the right winger Giuliano Simione.
Up front, French Veteran Antoine Griezmann and Julian Alvarez paired as the double number 9s.
SOLID DEFENSIVE STRUCTURE
Rigidity during defensive action is one noticeable attribute of Atletico Madrid's game model.
Having gone up with a 1-0 lead very early in the game, Simione deemed it a priority for his side to remain as rigid as possible defensively(a task they are well known for).
The focal point of this structure was to gain an edge over Real's wide players. To this aim, they did commit at least two players in the wide regions whenever Real had the ball there.
Indeed, this approach proved effective as Real's wide players who looked dangerous in the first leg became nullified during this second leg encounter.
In fact, the two Brazilian wingers had low performance stats in this game. Vinicius Jr stats was: 0 shot on target, 3 crosses(non on target) and 64 touches.
Rodrygo on the other hand had somewhat similar statistical value as his Brazilian teammate. He had only 1 shot on target, 2 crosses with non being on target, and 84 touches.
In the scenario below, we see Atletico in their typical rigid defensive shape of 6-2-2 (The two wingers falling backward to form a six-man defensive line with the 4 defenders; the two holding midfielders and the double strikers). Vinicius Jr receives the ball in the left flank, and three Atletico Madrid players quickly shift across to that area to close him down. This eventually resulted in him not being able to cause danger.
(Photo credit: Canal +)
ASYMMETRICAL WIDTH
During this game, Atletico witnessed a shift from an orthodox game system which involves having either two wingers or wing-backs provide attacking width for the team when they had the ball at the opponent's half, to one where only one wide player is tasked to provide the width for the team while the other moves infield to take on a central position.
The left winger was the one tasked with the latter role.
For most part of the game, Reinildo was the one who operated in this left winger position while Callagher who was positioned there on paper operates in the midfield. Lino also operated in that left wing position.
By having this player whose natural positions is on the flank, to occupy this central region, it could be said that Atletico Madrid aim to exploit their shooting ability from this position of the pitch.
This player could have a better chance of scoring goals if he shoots from this central region because it is closer to the opponent's goal than the wider region.
This tactic proved effective as he found space to receive the ball and shoot in this region of pitch during several situations, although he couldn't score.
Irrespective of this player's inability to score, this was a brilliant tactic, as it took Real Madrid by surprise because they weren't prepared to deal with such tactical twitch.
A good instance of this tactic is seen below. Here, Reinildo is in a central position instead of staying wide as usual.
(Photo Credit: Canal+)
Another good instance is seen again. Reinildo who at first stays close to the touch line,tucked infield as soon as his teammate advanced with the ball upfield.
(Photo Credit: Canal+)
This tactic as seen in the scenario below led to a goal scoring chance. Lino who has taken the place of Reinildo at the left winger position, stationed himself in a central position instead of staying wide. He receives the ball in a large area of space and shoots, but it was comfortably saved by Courtois.
(Photo Credit: Canal +)
DIRECT ATTACKING PLAY
For most occasions, Atletico Madrid were very direct during their attacking phase of play.
This style of play is a common attribute of most teams who favour double striker.
Playing with a double striker means that the probability of having a player who could be willing to make reward runs behind opponent's defensive line is high.
This is so because,even if one of the strikers shifts away from the number 9 position(for example to wider region or to the midfield), the other would be there to keep the opponent's defenders on their toes.
With this, there is always attacking depth for teams who opt for double number 9s, thus making them unpredictable, as they could decide to easily transition from playing short sequence of passes during build up play in their own half, into a longer direct pass to the front two. And if the opponent is not prepared to curtail the threat of these front players, it could lead to several goal scoring situations.
Teams like Inter Milan under Simone Inzaghi, Brentford under Thomas Frank are sides who also employed this style of play to a great extent.
In the scenario below, Atletico's double number 9s alongside three other players players who have now committed to the attack higher up the pitch early on, form a front five against Real's 4 man defense and one of their double holding midfielders.
Here we can see the willingness of Atletico to play a long ball from their own half directly to one of these players, Correa, who makes a dash behind Reals defenders.
This therefore resulted in a goal scoring chance, but Correa couldn't finish it off.
(Photo Credit : Canal +)
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